Summary and Academic Critique: John R. Bowen, On British Islam: Religion, Law, and Everyday Practice in Sharia Councils

John R. Bowen, On British Islam: Religion, Law, and Everyday Practice in Sharia Councils

(Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016), 288 pages, ISBN: 978-0-691-15854-9

By: Shahwiqar Shahin, PhD

Published in 2016, John Bowen’s On British Islam: Religion, Law, and Everyday Practice in Sharia Councils explores how sharia councils serve the religious and social needs of British Muslims.[1] The book draws from the fieldwork Bowen conducted between 2007 and 2013, offering a close look at how these councils operate in everyday life.

Bowen offers three main reasons for his interest in the topic. First, he wants to understand how sharia councils meet the spiritual needs of Muslims living in Britain. Second, he aims to trace the broader history of Islam in the country, showing how its presence has evolved over time. Third, he investigates why sharia councils have become a source of controversy—a “flashpoint” in national debates about Islamic law—and why they have attracted what he calls the “ire and fire” of the British press.[2]

To understand the role of sharia councils in Britain, Bowen argues that we must first grasp the contours of British Islam in the twenty-first century. This requires looking beyond abstract debates and focusing on the lived histories and everyday experiences of British Muslims—particularly as they relate to ethnic communities, migration patterns, and evolving identities. He explains:

British Islamic life is not the simple transposition to Britain of Asian practices; it is filtered through new institutions that are both British and Islamic.[3]

For his fieldwork, Bowen visited several British Muslim organisations and lobby groups, most of which were affiliated with specific ethnic or sectarian strands within Britain’s Muslim communities. He explored a variety of settings, including mosques, Islamic hospices (khanqah[4] or zāwiya[5]), and charities that specifically catered to Muslim concerns and interests. Through these “shari’a-based” institutions, Bowen observed how British Islamic scholar (ulama)[6]—particularly those involved with sharia councils—negotiate and express legal authority by drawing on both “pan-Islamic as well as British ways of judging.”[7]

Bowen’s book is divided into four parts. The first, titled “Pathways,” examines how Muslims from different parts of the world arrived in Britain and formed communities that, while diverse, often remained divided along ethnic and sectarian lines.

This section comprises three chapters. Chapter One sets the stage by offering introductory reflections and outlining the author’s research methodology. Chapter Two delves into the demographic pathways of British Muslims, focusing on those who migrated during the twentieth century from the Mirpur district of Azad Kashmir and the Sylhet region of Bangladesh.[8] Bowen illustrates how many of these migrants settled in areas populated by others with similar ethnic and geographic roots, fostering tightly-knit and culturally homogenous enclaves.

He also explores how first-generation migrants maintain transnational ties through regular visits to Pakistan or Bangladesh and by sending remittances to extended family members. These practices, he argues, go beyond financial support; they reflect a broader effort to sustain familial, cultural, and emotional bonds across borders. Bowen further notes that chain migration often serves as a conscious strategy to preserve ethnic, religious, and provincial identities, ensuring that new arrivals reflect and reinforce the heritage of the established community.

Chapter Three explores the Islamic pathways that took root in Britain. According to Bowen, British Muslims have largely followed one of three trajectories in shaping their religious life.

The first involves Muslims who migrated from South Asia and re-established the sectarian distinctions of their countries of origin—particularly among the Sufi-oriented Barelvis, the conservative Deobandis, and the traditionist Ahl-i-Hadith.[9]
The second pathway reflects a more adaptive approach. Here, Muslims engaged with the opportunities and resources available in Britain to support their communities and religious practices. This includes building mosques, establishing Islamic burial services, and launching national organisations such as the Muslim Council of Britain, the UK Islamic Mission, and Islamic student societies (ISOCs). [10]
The third trajectory centres on the formation of transnational ties. British Muslims developed and maintained ties with Muslim-majority countries and global Islamic movements, reinforcing a sense of belonging that transcends national borders.

Part Two of the book, titled “Practices,” examines the organisational structures and performative dynamics of various sharia councils in Britain. This section comprises four chapters. Chapter Four traces the historical emergence of these councils and opens with a brief overview of Islamic marriage and outlines the various ways in which Muslim couples may annul their marriages under Islamic law.[11]

Bowen then turns to the modern evolution of Islamic family law, examining how Muslim-majority nations undertook legal reforms during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. [12] He pays particular attention to the codification of Islamic family law in South Asia, a process that began under British colonial rule and led to the establishment of the dūr ul-qazā[13]—Islamic courts initially funded by the British Raj and later maintained in post-independence, secular, democratic India.[14] However, Bowen offers little detail regarding the institutional structures or procedural workings of these courts.[15]

The chapter concludes with an analysis of the early development of sharia councils in Britain. Bowen focuses on two of the country’s longest-running institutions: the Islamic Sharia Council in Leyton [16] and the Muslim Law (Shariah) Council in Ealing, London.[17] Through these case studies, he begins to trace the ways in which Islamic legal authority has been negotiated and institutionalised within the British context.

Chapter Five focuses on the day-to-day workings of the Islamic Sharia Council. Bowen examines how the council handles Islamic divorce applications—most of which come from Muslim women[18]—tracing how cases are filed, processed, and framed within what he describes as “bureaucratic claims to legitimacy.”[19] The chapter also draws on Islamic Sharia Council’s case files to illustrate how the council’s scholars (ulama) deliberate on individual cases and arrive at Islamic legal rulings. Bowen concludes by comparing the Islamic Sharia Council’s methods with those of the Muslim Law (Shariah) Council in Ealing, which he characterises as more “Sufi-directed.” Despite their doctrinal differences, he finds that both councils operate in broadly similar ways.[20]

A Muslim woman standing before Islamic scholars (ulama), symbolising a sharia council proceeding

Chapter Six, titled “Unstable Performativity,” explores the types of religious endorsement that sharia councils provide to British Muslims. Bowen identifies three modes of performativity at play when these councils issue an Islamic divorce.

The first is husband-led performativity, in which the Islamic scholars (ulama) of the council ensure that all procedural and ritual requirements of a husband’s pronouncement of divorce (ṭalāq) [21] are fulfilled.
The second is mutual performativity, where the ulama of the council verify that both spouses have agreed to dissolve the marriage—often following the wife’s request for khulʿ (release),[22] with the husband consenting to her departure.
The third is judicial performativity, which involves the ulama actively intervening to dissolve the marriage through faskh,[23] a form of judicial annulment grounded in Islamic legal precedent. [24]

While an English Decree Absolute can serve as supporting evidence that a marriage has ended, Bowen notes that the ulama do not view civil divorce as a valid expression of religious intent.[25] For many ulama, the absence of Islamic ritual or acknowledgment means the marriage remains spiritually intact.

The chapter draws on case files from both the Islamic Sharia Council and the Muslim Law (Shariah) Council, highlighting what Bowen terms “dilemmas of performativity”—instances where religious and legal frameworks clash, exposing the fragile legitimacy of these councils within the British legal landscape. [26]

Chapter Seven, titled “Competing Justifications,” explores the differences of opinions emerging among the ulama of the Islamic Sharia Council.[27] It reveals how council ulama must often weigh their decisions against the rulings and legal frameworks of countries where Muslims form the majority of the population. Bowen explains that countries such as Pakistan[28] and Saudi Arabia[29] draw heavily on classical Islamic jurisprudence in shaping their national legislation. As a result, their formal judicial systems can override—or at least challenge—the informal religious rulings issued by British sharia councils. This dynamic places the British ulama in a complex position, where they must navigate both transnational legal authority and local religious expectations.

Part Three consists of two chapters, each focusing on more recent sharia councils that reflect the diversity of Britain’s Muslim population. Chapter Eight examines the Birmingham Shariah Council, where women play a central role in the Islamic decision-making process. Bowen explains that this council emerged from a registered family counselling service led by two Muslim female counsellors. He notes that cases often begin in the form of counselling sessions, aimed at understanding the root causes of marital breakdown. The counsellors present their assessments to the sharia panel in the presence of the plaintiffs,[30] and the panel typically “signs off” on their recommendations.[31]

Bowen contrasts this approach with the more tradition-bound methods of the Islamic Sharia Council. While the latter adheres closely to formalistic procedures, the Birmingham council tends to issue Islamic divorces based on the wife’s testimony and the presentation of a civil divorce certificate.[32]

The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the Birmingham Fiqh Council, which Bowen describes as a consortium of Hanafi ulama. He found this council to be less pedantic and less conservative than the Islamic Sharia Council, yet more firmly rooted in the HanafI legal tradition than the Birmingham Shariah Council.[33]

Chapter Nine, titled “Sufi Encompassment,” examines the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, an informal Islamic family service whose legitimacy is rooted not in strict adherence to Suniī legal procedure—as seen with the Islamic Sharia Council[34]—but in what Bowen calls “Sufi sanctity.” At the centre of this tribunal is Barrister Faiz ul-Aqtab Siddiqi, who serves both as President of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal and as the spiritual leader (pir)[35] of the Hijazi Naqshbandiya Sufi Order, based in Nuneaton.

Bowen highlights Siddiqi’s dual role, noting his leadership within the Sufi order and his organisation of “spiritual surgeries” for followers.[36] As a practising barrister, Siddiqi frames the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal not as a conventional sharia council but as an arbitration service that resolves Muslim marital disputes as contractual disagreements under the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996.[37]

In contrast to the bureaucratic procedures of the Islamic Sharia Council, the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal operates with striking informality. Bowen found that the tribunal kept no written records, taking the notion of “informal service” quite literally:

These “arbitrations” are in fact counseling [sic] sessions, where Siddiqi’s saintly status adds to his credibility and to the likelihood that the couple will take the advice and return for follow-ups.[38]

Part Four of Bowen’s book explores how Islamic law is perceived within British society. Chapter Ten opens with a brief review of the preceding nine chapters before turning to its central focus: Sharia in English Law—The Argument So Far.[39] Bowen begins by revisiting the 2008 lecture delivered by Dr Rowan Williams and the intense media backlash it provoked.[40] He then shifts to the English civil divorce process, outlining how it functions within the broader legal system.[41] Importantly, Bowen highlights that English judges have historically treated Islamic marriages not as matters of family law but as private contractual agreements between Muslim spouses.[42]

Taking Islamic law to be a set of contract-oriented rules, independent of social context, fits with English legal expectations … But if in taking this approach the judge does not investigate the parties’ understandings of their contracts, she or he risks ignoring the English as well as the Islamic approaches to contracts.[43]

Furthermore, Bowen observed that English judges largely overlooked the legal reasoning offered by sharia councils. They gave little weight to Islamic legal opinions and failed to recognise the complex “dilemmas of performativity” involved in Islamic divorce proceedings.[44]

Chapter Eleven, titled When Can Sharia Be British? examines various British Muslim organisations and the services they provide to Muslim communities across the country. Bowen finds that, in contrast to most of these organisations, sharia councils have attracted disproportionate criticism and provoked considerable public anxiety. He investigates why these councils, in particular, have become a flashpoint for national controversy.

Bowen notes that, for the most part, British society accepts mosques as part of the country’s religious landscape—much like churches. [45] Similarly, sectors such as the ḥalāl[46] food industry, [47] Islamic finance, [48] and both private and state-funded Muslim schools have grown steadily, [49] facing relatively little public opposition. Yet despite decades of Muslim settlement and institution-building in Britain, Bowen finds that many Britons continue to question Muslims’ national loyalty. The existence of sharia councils, he argues, remains “highly active” in shaping these suspicions. [50]

He further explains how certain right-wing politicians and media outlets blame Britain’s multicultural policies for enabling these councils to operate. They claim that sharia councils undermine secular values, encourage social fragmentation, and contribute to the oppression of Muslim women.[51] In this way, the councils are portrayed not merely as legal forums but as symbols of cultural division and political unease.

Chapter Twelve, titled Internal Debates and Practical Convergences, explores the sectarian divisions and ideological debates within Britain’s Muslim communities. Bowen focuses in particular on the ongoing tension between conservative Muslims, who prioritise preserving inherited Islamic traditions, and liberal Muslims, who critique these traditions by referencing the diverse cultural, legal, and political precedents found across different periods of Islamic history.[52]

Between these opposing poles of conservatism and liberalism, Bowen identifies a third emerging perspective shaped by the “contextual shift” experienced by British Muslims—one that seeks to reinterpret Islam within a distinctly British mould. Among the most notable of these is the post-Salafī approach. Rooted in traditionist thought, this perspective seeks to align Islamic law with the broader objectives of God’s Eternal Law (maqāṣid al-shariah). Rather than rejecting tradition, post-Salafī Muslims engage with it critically, aiming to reframe contemporary issues—such as gender roles, domestic violence, and evolutionary theory—through a tradition-informed yet contextually responsive Islamic lens.[53]

Bowen identifies striking parallels between the Islamic and English legal systems in their treatment of marriage. Both frameworks recognise marriage as a contractual agreement between two consenting adults. Each system permits the inclusion of conditions or prenuptial clauses within the marriage contract. Both also establish minimum age requirements and outline the rights and legal status of children born within the marriage.[54] In comparing these systems, Bowen found:

Sharia Council[s] has a view of the process closest to the basis of current English divorce law as both focus on whether the marriage has ‘irretrievably broken down.[55]

In the concluding chapter, Bowen describes the British Muslim experience as one that has felt “concentration effects” – where people of similar ethnic roots, theological tendencies and experiences come together and “draw rings around one’s own group” within the inner cities and northern industrial towns of England. Living in isolation, first-generation Muslims look to the old country for solutions to keep their religious and cultural traditions in modern secular Britain.[56]

Despite Muslims’ efforts to rebuild their lives in Britain “on their own terms,” Bowen explains that the country’s unique social milieu has led to a “contextual shift” in how many Muslims relate to their traditional beliefs. While doctrinal differences between Barelvis and Deobandis have allayed in South Asia over time, these divisions have, paradoxically, become “hardened and simplified” in Britain.

Bowen observes that Britain’s ethnic, cultural, and sectarian diversity has penetrated and reshaped the functioning of sharia councils, distancing them from their original South Asian social and theological roots.[57] Yet he also highlights the unique advantages British Muslims enjoy compared to those in Muslim-majority countries. In countries such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the state frequently dictates religious orthodoxy and prescribes the modes through which Islam must be practised. By contrast, Britain enforces no official doctrine, allowing Muslims the freedom to explore alternative interpretations and critically engage with inherited traditions.[58]

Author’s Methodology

The main aim of Bowen’s book is to examine the historical, religious, and social experiences of British Muslims and how these have shaped the operation of sharia councils. To explore this, he closely analyses the daily workings of three such councils, assessing their impact on British Muslim communities.[59] His research draws on case files he reviewed from council archives, along with in-depth interviews with senior ulama, through which he examines the legal reasoning behind key decisions.

Among the three councils, Bowen identifies the Islamic Sharia Council in Leyton as the central point of comparison. He regards it as the archetype, shaped by a Salafi-Deobandi alliance that informs its legal methodology.[60] By contrasting this procedurally driven model with other councils—such as the Barelvi-oriented Muslim Law (Shariah) Council in West London, the female-led Birmingham Sharia Council, and the spiritually infused “Sufi-sanctity” of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal—Bowen challenges the widespread fear that Britain’s secular legal system is at risk of being replaced by “Sharia law.”

Strengths and Shortcomings

What sets Bowen’s work apart from other contributions in the field is its sustained focus on the views and lived experiences of senior ulama serving on sharia council panels. These scholars, by virtue of their training and religious authority, bring a nuanced understanding of Sunni legal thought, the procedural frameworks guiding council decisions, and the distribution of Islamic legal expertise within these institutions. Bowen further widens the analytical lens by situating sharia councils within broader institutional and transnational contexts, illustrating how they navigate internal juristic disagreements while responding to the social, political, and legal pressures of operating within a secular society.

Yet for all its strengths, Bowen’s study stops short of examining the specific legal mechanisms by which sharia councils adjudicate cases. Several critical questions remain unanswered: Which areas of Islamic family law form the core of council practice? To what extent do these councils align with a particular Sunni legal school? Do clients seek rulings rooted in South Asian cultural or legal traditions? And what forms of ijtihād (independent legal reasoning)[61] do the ulama employ when addressing contemporary challenges?

While Bowen gestures toward the historical lineage of these institutions—particularly noting the influence of India’s dār ul-qazā as an early model for British sharia councils, albeit one recalibrated to operate under the shadow of English civil law[62]—he leaves this avenue largely unexplored. My thesis builds directly on this insight, offering a detailed analysis of how the structural design and juristic ethos of the dār ul-qazā provided the conceptual and procedural foundations for the emergence of sharia councils in Britain.

That said, Bowen’s treatment is not without error. At times, he misidentifies Arabic terms, Islamic rituals, and cultural practices. For example, he refers to ʿaqīdah—which denotes Islamic creed or theology—as a Muslim birthing ritual, [63] when the correct term, as established in authentic ḥadīth literature, is ʿaqīqah.[64] Similarly, he uses sura[65] to denote a council, whereas the accurate Arabic term is shūrā.[66] He also mislabels shalwar kameez—a traditional South Asian garment worn by both men and women—as “sahwal kameez.”[67]

A more substantive issue arises in Bowen’s interview with Suhaib Ḥasan of the Islamic Sharia Council. Bowen reports the following:

“…in Sura al-Kahf, where Moses tells him [Khiḍir] not to speak, and he does, and then again, and then after the third time, Moses says, “That’s over and we will go separate ways.”[68]

However, the Quran clearly presents Khiḍir—not Moses—as the one who instructs silence and ultimately ends the journey after Moses interrupts him a third time.[69] Taken together, these errors do not appear to be isolated lapses but reflect a broader pattern of imprecision that raises concerns about the reliability of Bowen’s scriptural and linguistic references—particularly in a work so centrally concerned with Islamic legal and theological authority.

Nonetheless, Bowen’s broader contribution remains significant. He rightly observes that sharia councils were originally established to provide traditional Islamic guidance to British Muslims on a range of social and religious matters. Since their emergence in the early 1980s, however, these councils have been inundated with a growing number of applications—particularly from Muslim women seeking religious divorces.[70] This surge in demand has made sharia councils, and by extension Islamic law, a visible and influential presence in Britain.

Crucially, it also lends weight to the argument that many Muslim women see these councils as the only institution in Britain capable of addressing their personal, spiritual, and marital concerns. In doing so, the councils have inadvertently become platforms that bolster Muslim women’s religious and social agency—despite the androcentric structures often embedded within them.

Concluding Thoughts

John Bowen’s On British Islam offers a rich and pioneering account of how sharia councils operate within the fabric of British Muslim life. Through detailed anthropological fieldwork, he sheds light on the lived experiences of British Muslims, the institutional diversity of Islamic legal services, and the performative dimensions of religious divorce. Moving beyond theoretical abstraction, Bowen attends closely to the everyday exercise of Islamic legal authority within Britain’s secular, multicultural landscape.

Yet, for all its strengths, Bowen’s analysis stops short of engaging with the deeper Islamic legal epistemologies that shape the decision-making of sharia council ulama. The precise methodologies they employ—particularly their use of ijtihād (independent legal reasoning), their juristic sources, and the extent to which they adhere to or depart from specific Sunni legal schools—remain underexplored. It is at this juncture that my own study, The Islamic Legal and Cultural Influences on Britain’s Sharia Councils (2023), conducted under Bowen’s supervision, seeks to advance the conversation.

Focusing on the Islamic epistemologies of the ulama, my research demonstrates that British sharia councils are not merely importing Hanafi orthodoxy from South Asia, as often assumed. Rather, they operate within a dynamic framework of takhayyur[71] —selecting rulings deemed munāsib (suitable)[72] from across the four popular Sunni legal schools—to meet the complex spiritual, social, and legal needs of a diasporic Muslim community. This approach reflects a tacit yet resilient form of Islamic legal pluralism—one shaped not only by classical jurisprudence, but also by contemporary British realities, transnational Islamic movements, and evolving communal expectations.

My study further reveals how this epistemological flexibility coexists with entrenched structures of taqlīd[73]—a unquestioning adherence to Sunni orthodoxy among many British Muslims—that simultaneously empowers and constrains the ulama. While takhayyur enables legal adaptability, taqlīd often legitimises patriarchal authority, reinforcing androcentric power dynamics within the councils. These tensions, largely absent from Bowen’s otherwise groundbreaking work, are critical to understanding how Islamic law is internalised, authorised, and contested in the British Muslim context.

Moreover, my study situates these internal dynamics within broader legal and cultural environments. The religious illiteracy of British family solicitors, for instance, often results in poorly informed legal advice that can severely affect the outcomes of sharia council proceedings—particularly for women navigating transnational marriages and civil divorces. To address this, my study recommends the inclusion of female legal professionals trained in both Islamic jurisprudence and British family law, thereby increasing women’s agency and safeguarding procedural equity.

In contextualising these findings, it becomes clear that sharia councils are not static, premodern relics imposed upon a liberal society, as they are often portrayed in British media. For many native Britons, these councils provoke fears of a parallel legal system undermining secular democracy and women’s rights. Such portrayals frame sharia councils as patriarchal, archaic institutions incompatible with modern British values.

However, empirical studies—such as Sonia Nûrîn Shah-Kazemi’s Untying the Knot,[74] Shaista Gohir’s MWNUK reports,[75] and the work of Cassandra Balchin and Sohail Warraich—paint a more complex picture: one that exposes how legal invisibility, rather than legal plurality, is often what harms Muslim women most. [76]

These reports, alongside Samia Bano’s work[77] and the 2018 government review on sharia councils,[78] deepen our understanding of how Islamic legal practices both challenge and contribute to the evolving discourse on multiculturalism, justice, and gender in Britain.

Ultimately, the question is no longer whether sharia can be British. The real question is how ulama in Britain, drawing from centuries of juristic tradition, are reinterpreting Islam within a secular, postcolonial, and pluralistic society—and how the British state, legal system, and public discourse will choose to respond. Sharia councils, far from being anachronistic enclaves, are laboratories of religious reform, communal negotiation, and epistemological contestation. They represent not the failure of multiculturalism, but its unfinished experiment. As such, they compel us to reconsider what legal pluralism looks like—not in theory, but in practice—within the moral and civic imagination of modern Britain.

References

[1] John R. Bowen, On British Islam: Religion, Law, and Everyday Practice in Sharia Councils (Princeton University Press, 2016), p. 3.

[2] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 3–4.

[3] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 6.

[4] khanqah (خانقاه). A Sufi retreat, convent, or monastery; a spiritual lodge used for devotion, instruction, and communal living by members of a Sufi order (ṭarīqa). Traditionally, a khanqah served as a centre for spiritual training, dhikr (remembrance of God), and hospitality. See “خانقاه” in John Thompson Platts, A Dictionary of Urdu, Classical Hindi and English (1884 Edition), Urdu, English and Hindi Edition, London 1884 (Munshiram Manoharlal (Reprint 2004), 1884), p. 1001.

[5] Sin: zāwiya (زاوية), Plu: zawāyā (زوايا). “Corner,” “small mosque,” or “Sufi hospice.” In Islamic tradition, a zāwiya typically refers to a small religious retreat or spiritual lodge, often associated with Sufi practice, where worship, teaching, and communal life take place. The term can also denote a physical corner or niche within a building. See “زاوية” in Hans Wehr, Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic: Arabic-English., ed. by J. M. Cowan, 3rd edn (Spoken Language Services Inc, U.S, 1976), p. 387.

[6] Sin: ‘ālim (عالم), Pl: ulama (علماء). An Islamic scholar. See “عالم”, in Wehr, Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, p. 636.

[7] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 7.

[8] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 12.

[9] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 26–37.

[10] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 37–44.

[11] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 47–50.

[12] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 52.

[13] Sin: dār ul-qazā (دار القضاء), Plu: dūr ul-qazā (دور القضاء). Literally meaning “House of the Judge,” the dār ul-qazā refers to a system of Islamic courts institutionalised in colonial South Asia to adjudicate matters of personal status—such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance—within the framework of Shari’a. Established under British rule, these courts operated as state-recognised yet religiously anchored legal institutions, serving the specific needs of Muslim communities in India.

As Professor John Bowen observes, the dār ul-qazā remained part of the legal and institutional memory carried by South Asian scholars who later migrated to Britain. These ulama brought with them deeply rooted assumptions and procedural habits shaped by colonial encounters with Islamic law. In establishing sharia councils in the UK, they effectively reimagined the dār ul-qazā—transposing an institution forged under imperial authority into the legal and cultural landscape of contemporary Britain. The result was a set of hybrid forums which, though formally non-state, echoed the adjudicatory role and normative framework of their colonial predecessors.

For a more detailed analysis, see: Shahwiqar Shahin, The Islamic Legal and Cultural Influences on Britain’s Sharia Councils (PhD diss., School of Advanced Study [Heythrop College], University of London, 2023), available at: https://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/9865/

[14] Ministry of Law & Justice, Constitution of India, 1950 <https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15240/1/constitution_of_india.pdf>.

[15] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 52–54.

[16] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 54–61.

[17] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 61–62.

[18] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 65.

[19] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 67.

[20] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 85–87.

[21] talaq (طلاق). An Islamic divorce. Normally initiated and concluded by the husband. See “طلاق” in Wehr, Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, p. 567.

[22] khulʿ (خلع), sometimes rendered khula. In Islamic family law, khulʿ refers to a wife’s right to initiate divorce by requesting release from the marriage, typically in exchange for compensation or the return of her dower (mahr). It is a form of dissolution granted with the husband’s consent, though some jurists allow it through judicial intervention. The term literally means “removal” or “taking off,” signifying the wife’s release from the marital bond. See “خلع” in Wehr, Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, p. 256.

[23] faskh (فسخ). In Islamic family law, faskh refers to the judicial dissolution or annulment of a marriage. It is granted by a qualified authority—typically a shari’a council, an Islamic judge (qāḍī) or Islamic legal body—on specific legal grounds, such as harm, abuse, impotence, or failure to provide maintenance. Unlike ṭalāq (divorce initiated by the husband) or khulʿ (divorce initiated by the wife with the husband’s consent), faskh nullifies the marriage contract without requiring the husband’s agreement. See “فسخ” in Wehr, Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, p. 712.

[24] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 89.

[25] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 93.

[26] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 101–02.

[27] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 103–08.

[28] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 109–14.

[29] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 114–17.

[30] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 174.

[31] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 124–30.

[32] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 132–35.

[33] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 140–42.

[34] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 143.

[35] Pir (پير) — literally “elder” or “saint” — refers to a spiritual guide or master in Sufi Islam. The pīr serves as a mentor who offers spiritual instruction, moral guidance, and blessings to disciples, known as murīdīn (plural of murīd). Usually affiliated with a Sufi order, or ṭarīqa (Plu: ṭuruq), the pīr plays a central role in leading adherents along a spiritual path toward divine closeness.

Revered for their wisdom and spiritual insight, pīrs are often regarded not merely as teachers, but also as intercessors and embodiments of sanctity. In certain contexts, the term may be loosely translated as “saint” or “holy man,” though its deeper meaning is anchored in the unique theological and institutional frameworks of the Sufi tradition.

[36] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 147–55.

[37] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 155–58 & 163.

[38] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 168.

[39] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 173–74.

[40] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 175–76.

[41] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 176–78.

[42] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 181–82.

[43] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 190.

[44] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 193.

[45] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 194.

[46] ḥalāl (حلال). Literally meaning “permissible” or “lawful,” ḥalāl refers to anything allowed under Islamic law (sharia). It applies broadly to food, drink, behaviour, financial transactions, and other aspects of daily life. Most commonly, it is contrasted with ḥarām (forbidden), especially in the context of dietary laws, where ḥalāl denotes food prepared in accordance with Islamic guidelines. See “حلال” in Wehr, Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, p. 199.

[47] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 195–98.

[48] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 198–99.

[49] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 200–03.

[50] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 205.

[51] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 205–06.

[52] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 209–10.

[53] Bowen, On British Islam, pp. 218–24.

[54] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 211.

[55] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 217.

[56] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 229.

[57] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 230.

[58] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 231.

[59] Chapters Five and Seven focus on the Islamic Shari’a Council in Leyton, while Chapter Eight examines the Birmingham Sharia Council, and Chapter Nine explores the workings of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal.

[60] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 174.

[61] ijtihād (اجتهاد). Intellectual effort, exertion, or diligence in interpreting Islamic law. In Islamic legal theory, ijtihād refers to the process of independent reasoning employed by one who is authorised to engaging in ijtihād (mujtahid) to derive legal rulings from the foundational sources—the Quran and hadith traditions—in cases where no explicit text applies. It represents one of the highest forms of legal authority in classical jurisprudence. See “اجتهاد,” in Wehr, Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, p. 143.

[62] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 128.

[63] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 42

[64] Tirmidhi, Abu ʿIsa Muhammad ibn ʿIsa at-, ‘Chapter: About The ’Aqiqah’, in Jami’ al-Tirmidhi, trans. by Sunnah.com, 49 Books (Arabic), 46 Books (English) vols (Sunnah.com), Book 19, Hadith Number 34 (Arabic), Book 17, Hadith Number 1522 (English) <https://sunnah.com/tirmidhi/2/169>.

[65] سورة – Sūra, which translates as a “chapter” and is often used to refer to chapters in the Quran. See: Wehr, Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, p. 441. (See: سورة)

[66] Bowen, On British Islam,, p. 40.

[67] Bowen, On British Islam,, p. 202.

[68] Bowen, On British Islam, p. 81.

[69] ⁷⁶Moses said, ‘From now on, if I query anything you do, banish me from your company– you have put up with enough from me.’

⁷⁷And so they travelled on. Then, when they came to a town and asked the inhabitants for food but were refused hospitality, they saw a wall there that was on the point of falling down and the man repaired it. Moses said, ‘But if you had wished you could have taken payment for doing that.’

⁷⁸He said, ‘This is where you and I part company. I will tell you the meaning of the things you could not bear with patiently:” See: Quran (18:76-78) in The Qur’an, trans. by M. A. S. Abdel Haleem, Reissue edition (OUP Oxford, 2008), p. 188.

[70] Bowen, On British Islam,, p. 47.

[71] Takhayyur (تخير) is an adverb derived from khayr (خير), which translates as “to choose”. See “خير”, in Wehr, Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, p. 266.

[72] “مناسب”, in Wehr, Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, p. 960.

[73] Taqlīd is a verbal noun derived from the Arabic root word “qa-la-da,” which has been defined by Hans Wehr as “to adorn with a necklace.” The term taqlīd is associated with various Islamic legal concepts such as “imitation” “blind and uncritical faith,” “servility,” “unquestioning acceptance,” and “unreasonable acceptance,” and carries a negative connotation among proponents of ijtihād and Western academics of Islamic law.

See “تقليد”, in Wehr, Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, p. 786. Noel Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh University Press, 1964), p. 80; George Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West (Edinburgh University Press, 1981), p. 199; Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Clarendon Paperbacks, 1982), p. 71; Ann. K. S Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam, London Oriental Series (Routledge Curzon, 2006), xxxvi, p. 12.

[74] Shah-Kazemi, Sonia Nûrîn, Untying the Knot: Muslim Women, Divorce and the Shariah, Child Welfare and Development (Nuffield Foundation, 2001), p. 80 <http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/untying-knot-muslim-women-divorce-and-shariah>

[75] Gohir, Shaista, (2016), Information and Guidance on Muslim Marriage and Divorce in Britain (Birmingham,UK,: Muslim Women’s Network UK).

[76] Cassandra Balchin and Sohail Akbar Warraich, Recognizing the Un-Recognized: Inter-Country Cases and Muslim Marriages & Divorces in Britain, Women Living under Muslim Laws (The Russell Press, 2006), pp. v–vi.

[77] Samia Bano, Muslim Women and Shari’ah Councils: Transcending the Boundaries of Community and Law, 1st edn (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Samia Bano, ‘Agency, Autonomy, and Rights: Muslim Women and Alternative Dispute Resolution in Britain’, in Gender and Justice in Family Law Disputes: Women, Mediation, and Religious Arbitration, ed. by Samia Bano (Brandeis University Press, 2017); Samia Bano, An Exploratory Study of Shariah Councils in England with Respect to Family Law (University of Reading and the British Ministry of Justice, 2 October 2012).

[78] Mona Siddiqui and others, The Independent Review into the Application of Sharia Law in England and Wales, CCS0118708404 (Home Office, February 2018).

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